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1 Introduction
In this paper we develop a multi-jurisdictional, infinite horizon, elections model
characterised by asymmetric information between politicians and voters and
an absence of policy commitment with regards to trade policy. The political
districts of the model, or states, form an electoral college that elects the president
from two candidates from rival parties. The model is used to investigate how
the distribution of voters with heterogeneous preferences across swing states
gives rise to incentives for strategic trade protection by incumbent politicians
who wish to maximise their chance of re-election.
The paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the model pre-
sented extends the trade policy literature by using a political agency method-
ology that has never been used to address trade policy issues. The approach
examines the electoral incentives for the strategic choice of secondary policy
issues in a framework characterised by asymmetric information between politi-
cians and voters regarding politicians’ preferences over trade policy and lack of
pre-commitment to a particular trade policy prior to election. Electoral incen-
tives can cause political incumbents to alter their policy choice in early years
in power in order to influence voter beliefs about the nature of future trade
policy. By building a reputation as a protectionist or free-trader, the incumbent
attracts swing voters to his platform.
The type of policy modelled in this type of framework is characterised by the
inability to tailor it to satisfy the preference of voters at the state level, making
it a national policy. Trade policy is thus an excellent candidate for a policy with
this feature. Hence, it is the ability to garner electoral college votes nationally
that drives results, rather than ‘pork-barrel’ state level politics. Moreover, it is
assumed that the political incumbent has discretion over the selection of trade
policy. While this is a reduced form of a more general notion of a cohesive
government whose policy decisions are influenced by the desire to retain control
of power, it is also the case that over the past few decades there have been pe-
riods where the US President was granted trade promotion authority (formerly
fast-track authority) to determine trade policy. When granted such authority,
the President is able to negotiate trade agreements faster, and while Congress
retains power to reject proposed legislation, it has no power of amendment and
limited room for debate. While discretion of certain policy instruments is con-
strained by multilateral agreements, there is still considerable scope for erecting
Non-Tariﬀ Barriers, or implementing safeguards, granting relevance to the as-
sumptions of our framework.
Second, we contribute to the political agency literature by developing a
tractable multi-jurisdictional framework that extends the single-district political
agency framework of recent contributions to the literature by List and Sturm
(2006) and Besley and Burgess (2002). We model the electoral system as an
electoral college, where electoral votes are attached to political states. This
innovation adds a spatial dimension that delivers additional results on how the
distribution of single-issue voters across swing states can influence trade pol-
icy decisions. The framework delivers three new propositions that relate the
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location of swing voters across swing states to the likelihood that incumbents
engage in strategic trade protection.
The third contribution of the paper is that we provide empirical evidence
using data for the United States that lends support for the type of mechanisms
present in the theoretical model. By augmenting the benchmark empirical spec-
ification used by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) we find evidence in the
data to support the theoretical hypothesis that the concentration of a sector
across states that are both swing and decisive for election outcomes is a signif-
icant determinant of the level of trade protection of that sector. This provides
formal support for the claims made in the popular press about the politics be-
hind the recent United States - European Union steel tariﬀs dispute, “that steel
tariﬀs were introduced for short-term political advantage ... in order to gain
votes in key states like West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Michigan where
the steel industry is a major employer” (The Guardian, November 17th, 2003).
The literature with regards to the role of concentration on endogenous pro-
tection is, in general, very diﬀerent to the framework employed in this paper.
The first strand of the literature is the long-standing tradition that addresses
the role of concentration for collective action. The eﬀect of geographical concen-
tration on facilitating lobby formation and therefore positively aﬀecting trade
policy, was first put forward in Olson (1971). The relationship between the
location of industry and import barriers has been debated at length in this
literature. The "close group" hypothesis that the concentration of firms al-
lows them to overcome free-rider problems and organise lobbying eﬃciently is
widely accepted and Hansen (1990), among others, provides supporting empiri-
cal evidence. This contrasts with the "dispersed group" argument which posits
that geographically dispersed industries enjoy broader political representation
(depending on the electoral rules) as empirically supported by Pincus (1975),
for instance. Busch and Reinhart (1999) explicitly distinguishing between ge-
ographical concentration, and ‘political concentration’, defined as the spread
of industry across political districts, in order to reconcile the two hypotheses.
Their finding that geographically concentrated but politically dispersed indus-
tries in the US are more likely to be protected, suggests that the mechanisms
linking location, concentration and protection are more complex than simply
those that can be captured through standard measures of concentration. This
paper is not related to the collective action literature on concentration, focusing
instead on the eﬀects of concentration for electoral outcomes and thus electoral
incentives to protect. Our framework suggests concentration might not always
matter as such, but rather it is the presence of industrial concentrations in
pivotal locations that has an impact on trade protection.
The second strand of the literature stems from the seminal contribution of
Grossman and Helpman (1994,1996) on "Protection for Sale" that analyses the
eﬀects of campaign contributions for policy decision-making. Mitra (1999) con-
siders endogenous lobby formation in a theoretical extension of the Grossman
and Helpman framework. A multitude of papers have followed in this strand to
explain the determinants of trade policy and are surveyed in Helpman (1997)
and Grossman and Helpman (2002). Recent contributions to the lobbying lit-
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erature for trade include Bombardini (2005) who introduces the decisions of
individual firms and hence the role of size distributions within industries in
determining protection. The relevance of lobbies has been widely tested, for
example by Goldberg and Maggi (1997), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000),
Eicher and Osang (2002). While geographical concentration measures have also
been included in empirical tests of the lobby model, such as Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay (2000), they have not been linked to location in swing states.
We augment their specification in the empirical section of this paper to show
that political decisions also react to electoral incentives.
The most common electoral approach to the political economy of trade and
secondary policy issues is that of median voter models, such as Mayer (1984)
and probabilistic voting frameworks such as Yang (1995). These have been
used, for example, to explain diﬀerences in protectionism based on countries’
constitutional set-up (Roelfsema, 2004) or to consider how trade retaliation
and liberalisation is aﬀected by the ideological distribution of voters in trading
partners (Wiberg, 2005). Our framework is distinct from these approaches since
we examine the eﬀects of swing voters in a model of the electoral college without
policy commitment. We show that a redistribution of voters between states in
the electoral college, holding the population of each voter type constant, can
make trade protection more or less likely. Such redistributions have no impact
in frameworks in the spirit of Mayer (1984).
Willmann (2005) employs a median voter model to oﬀer an explanation for
the empirical relationship between geographical concentration and protection
by introducing regional voters who anticipate that their representatives will
internalise the costs of protection, once at the national level. The model cannot
oﬀer an explanation, however, as to why industries with the same degree of
geographical concentration, that are located in diﬀerent political states, may be
systematically awarded diﬀerent levels of protection.
Finally, a growing political agency literature has more recently addressed the
issue of electoral incentives for policy choices in secondary policy issues, such as
trade policy or environmental policy, about which smaller groups of voters have
very strong views. Recent contributions to this literature include Coate and
Morris (1998), Besley and Case (1995), Besley and Burgess (2002) and List and
Sturm (2006). Our basic modelling approach is closest to Besley and Burgess
(2002) and List and Sturm (2006), while extending to a multi-jurisdictional
framework.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the
theoretical model of the electoral college and discuss the testable empirical im-
plications of the model. The theoretical predictions of the model are tested
empirically with US data in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we develop a multi-jurisdictional, infinite horizon, elections model
characterised by asymmetric information between politicians and voters and an
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absence of policy commitment with regards to trade policy. Political incumbents
with private preferences over trade policy may have an incentive to build a
reputation through the strategic selection of trade policy, in order to swing
single-issue voters to their platform in forthcoming elections.
The model contributes to the political agency literature by extending the
single-district political agency framework of List and Sturm (2006) and Besley
and Burgess (2002) to include a continuum of political districts that form an elec-
toral college. This innovation adds a spatial dimension to the political agency
framework that delivers results on how the distribution of single-issue voters
across swing states can influence trade policy decisions. Moreover, the model
extends the trade policy literature by using a methodology from the political
agency literature that has not been used before to examine the strategic in-
centives for trade policy choice. The empirical implications that arise from the
theoretical framework are then tested in section 3.
2.1 Economic Environment
Consider a country with a continuum of political districts1, or states, s, over the
interval [0, 1], each with a unit mass of voters. These states form an electoral
college, through which electoral outcomes are determined. In particular, let
each state contribute to the electoral outcome through a single electoral college
vote, so the aggregate measure of electoral college votes over the continuum of
unit interval is also 1.
Further suppose that in any presidential election in the infinite-horizon game
there are two candidates from rival parties, Democrat (D) and Republican (R),
competing for votes. An election may be between two newcomers, or alterna-
tively, between an incumbent politician and a challenger. If a candidate wins a
majority of votes in a state, then the electoral college vote of that state is won
by that candidate. The election is won by the candidate with the majority of
electoral college votes, which corresponds to gaining a majority in a measure of
states greater than 12 .
Politicians are assumed to face a binding term limit of two periods. Af-
ter two terms of holding oﬃce an incumbent leaves the political arena and a
new candidate from within the party competes with the rival candidate in the
presidential elections.
2.1.1 Incumbents Policy Preferences
During each term of oﬃce the incumbent politician must choose the level of pub-
lic spending, or ‘ideology’, denoted by g, and a secondary policy, such as trade
policy for a particular sector, denoted by r. Politicians of either party whose
personal views are in favour of free trade are referred to as ‘free-traders’ (F ),
1The assumption of a continuum of political districts allows us to appeal to the law of large
number in the calculation of electoral college votes won by each candidate. This facilitates the
analysis greatly by making the framework tractable. The role of this assumption is discussed
in more detail in section 2.4.
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while those in favour of trade protection are referred to as ‘protectionists’ (P ).
Suppose that a randomly selected candidate, of either party, is a protectionist
with probability π. While politicians’ preferences over public spending are as-
sumed to be public knowledge, their preferences over r are private. Moreover,
electoral candidates are unable to commit to a particular trade policy prior to
election.
The level of public spending is assumed to be continuous, or, equivalently,
ideology is selected from a continuous spectrum. In contrast, trade policy takes
the form of a binary choice, to be made by the incumbent politician, between
trade protection (r = 1) and free trade (r = 0). The trade policy is assumed
to have negligible financial impact on government revenue, and so the model
abstracts from any possible revenue-raising incentives for trade protection.
Suppose politicians earn an ‘ego-rent’, ζ, from holding a term in oﬃce and
receive zero payoﬀ when out of oﬃce. In addition, a politician faces a utility cost
c = {cL,cH} from deviating from his own preferred trade policy, where cH > cL.
Let the probability of any politician having a low utility cost be Pr(c = cL) = p.
Cost c can be interpreted as a psychological cost of setting a policy in conflict
with personal views. Moreover, let β denote the common discount factor, where
β is assumed to satisfy the following restriction:
cH > βζ > cL > 0 (1)
Inequality (1) states that the ego-rent from holding one more term in oﬃce
lies between the high and low utility costs.
2.1.2 Voter Preferences
Voters are assumed to have heterogeneous preferences over the two policy issues.
Suppose four types of voters comprise the measure of voters in each state. A
voter of type k in state s, can be either a Democrat (D), a Republican (R), a
free-trader (F ), or a protectionist (P ). Let γsk denote the proportion of voter
type k in the unit measure of voters in state s, such that:X
k
γsk = 1, where k ∈ {D,R,F, P} and γsk ∈ [0, 1] (2)
The D and R voters are indiﬀerent about the trade policy issue and vote
purely on the basis of their preferences over public policy. Politicians’ choice of
g may also be interpreted as reflecting their ideological position, so D and R
voters cast their vote according to their ideological preferences. Even though
trade protection, e.g. a tariﬀ, raises the relative domestic price of the protected
good, we assume this negative eﬀect is negligible compared to the intensity of
their ideological preferences. That is, although a price increase in one good
in the consumption basket lowers consumer surplus, it is not a suﬃcient cost
to cause voters to shift their support to another platform. Hence, measure
γsD of voters always vote Democrat, while γ
s
R always vote Republican, in any
presidential election.
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P and F voters are ‘single-issue voters’ or ‘swing voters’ with strong prefer-
ences over the secondary policy issue, trade policy. Protectionists may be voters
employed in import-competing sectors, whose jobs may be at risk from foreign
competition under free trade e.g. Steel industry workers whose employment
may be secured through a steel tariﬀ. In contrast, free-traders reflect any voters
with strong preferences against trade protection, such as, perhaps, students of
economics.
The intensity of swing voters’ preferences is assumed to be such that the
payoﬀ received from the implementation of their preferred trade policy domi-
nates any ideological considerations. Suppose protectionists receive a payoﬀ of
x > 0 if r = 1 and 0 otherwise, while supporters of free trade receive x if r = 0
and 0 otherwise. Swing voters thus vote for the candidate they believe has the
highest probability of implementing their preferred policy. Where candidates
are perceived to be identical in this respect, swing voters are assumed to cast
their vote by flipping a coin.
Note that r, referred to as trade policy in this paper, can be interpreted
as any secondary policy about which a subset of voters have strong views and
which has two key characteristics. The first is that r represents a national
policy decision that cannot be tailored to satisfy the preferences of voters at the
state level. While some voters may have strong preferences regarding, say, the
introduction or abolition of the death penalty, it is possible for a policy decision
to be made at the state-level, as is observed in the US. In contrast, a tariﬀ on
steel imports, or any other trade policy, can only apply at the national level.
Other national policies include immigration policy, foreign policy, participation
in a regional trade agreement (e.g. European Union membership), membership
in international organisation (e.g. WTO), to mention a few.
The second key characteristic of policy r is that the political incumbent is as-
sumed to have discretion over its selection. Whilst we model the decision-maker
as an incumbent politician, the model is consistent with a broader interpreta-
tion, where decisions are made by a group of government agents operating as a
cohesive entity, whose decisions may be influenced by their desire to perpetuate
their control of power.
2.1.3 Electoral Uncertainty
Uncertainty in the outcome of the election stems from uncertainty at both the
state level and the national level. Each state is assumed to be subject to an id-
iosyncratic pro-D shock, νs, that can be interpreted as a shock to voter turnout.
Since a vote gained by the D candidate, is also a vote lost by the R candidate,
a positive (or negative) νs gives the D candidate an advantage (or disadvan-
tage) of 2νs. For convenience, we redefine 2νs as εs. Assume εs is distributed
identically and independently according to a symmetric, single-peaked probabil-
ity density function h (εs), with support [−ψ,ψ], and a continuous cumulative
distribution function H(εs). The value of ψ is important to the extent that it
aﬀects the degree of uncertainty over the outcome of elections in each state. We
assume a suﬃciently wide support so that all states are ‘swing states’. That is,
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no candidate can be certain of winning a majority in any state, but the proba-
bility of each candidate winning a majority can be computed for any state with
a distribution of voter types, γsk, where k ∈ {D,R,F, P}, given the incumbent’s
policy choice r and the cumulative distribution function H(εs).
In addition to uncertainty at the state level, we introduce aggregate uncer-
tainty2 in the form of a ‘pro-incumbent shock’, u, in electoral college votes. In an
election between two untested politicians, the shock can be in favour of either.
Shock u widens (or narrows) the diﬀerence in electoral college votes between
candidates by 2u. For convenience, we redefine 2u as η, where η is distributed
according to a symmetric, single-peaked probability density function, f (η) and
a continuous cumulative distribution function F (η). Again, we assume a suf-
ficiently wide support so that no candidate can secure a majority of electoral
college votes. In combination, the state-level and national shocks ensure that
no candidate can guarantee to win any state s, or the electoral college overall.
In the US, the president is elected indirectly through the Electoral College.
Voters vote for state electors who pledge to vote for a particular candidate.
These electors cast their electoral vote and the candidate with a majority of
electoral votes wins the presidency. In our model, voters are assumed to vote
for the candidates directly, while the electoral college system is embodied by the
fact that candidates need to win a majority in a majority of states to win the
election, rather than a direct majority. The assumptions we make are equivalent
to assuming that state-level elections are between two honest electors that have
pledged to vote for the D or R candidate, respectively, if elected. A state-level
majority won by a D elector corresponds to an electoral college vote won by the
D presidential candidate, and similarly for states where the R elector wins a
majority. Interpreting our model in this way allows shock η to be interpreted as
mistakes made by electors when voting, or the presence of a random measure of
‘faithless electors’ who vote for a candidate other than the candidate pledged.
Assuming f (η) is symmetric around 0 and single-peaked implies that large
measures of mistakes in electoral votes cast or large measures of faithless electors
are increasingly unlikely.
2.1.4 Timing of the Elections Game
Events in the infinitely repeated elections model with infinitely-lived voters oc-
cur in the following order.
1. The incumbent politician draws a period one utility cost c = {cL,cH},
observed only by the incumbent.
2. The incumbent makes policy decisions g and r.
3. Policy choices are observed by voters and the election for the presidency
in period two takes place.
2The uncertainty reflected in the state-specific shocks is insuﬃcient to give rise to aggregate
uncertainty, as a result of the infinite nature of states along the continuum. We thus introduce
aggregate uncertainty in the form of a shock to electoral college votes at the national level.
The importance of this assumption is made clear in section 2.4.
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(a) If the term limit is non-binding, then the election is between the
incumbent and a randomly selected rival from the other party.
(b) If the term limit is binding, the election is between two randomly
selected candidates from either party.
4. The winner of the presidential election is in oﬃce in the next period.
The game is then repeated infinitely through stages (1) to (4). In the next
few sections we solve the game by backwards induction and characterise the
unique equilibrium strategies of voters and politicians, for a given distribution
of voters. The strategic incentives for trade policy choice are examined and the
role that the distribution of swing voters plays in shaping these incentives is
analysed.
2.2 Political Equilibrium
The Markov Perfect equilibria of the game between politicians and voters can be
characterised by restricting attention to strategies that depend only on payoﬀ-
relevant past events, rather than the entire history of the game. Markov strate-
gies for the incumbent politician, Cij , where i ∈ {D,R} and j ∈ {F,P} and for
type ks voters, where ks ∈ {D,R,F, P}, can be said to form an equilibrium if
they maximise the value functions of voters and the incumbent politician, given
the strategies of the other players.
For the incumbent politician choosing trade policy, the payoﬀ-relevant his-
tory of the game is fully described by (a) his utility cost draw, and (b) the
number of terms he has already spent in oﬃce. Hence, we define a strategy
for an incumbent politician as a rule that describes the probability with which
he implements trade protection as a function of parameters describing the dis-
tribution of voters3 across the electoral college, his realised utility cost c and
whether he is in his first or second term of oﬃce.
For type ks voters, the payoﬀ-relevant history of the game is, where applica-
ble, the first term trade policy decision of an incumbent who is up for reelection
against a randomly selected challenger. In elections between two new candi-
dates, there is no payoﬀ-relevant history on which voters can condition their
behaviour. For voter types ks = {D,R} a strategy is a rule that specifies the
probability with which they vote for the Democrat or Republican candidate.
For voter types ks = {P,F}, a strategy is a re-election rule that specifies the
probability with which they vote for the incumbent in elections between an in-
cumbent and a challenger, where this probability depends on the updated beliefs
regarding the incumbent’s private preferences regarding r, conditional on the
incumbent’s trade policy decision in his first term of oﬃce.
Let g∗(D) and g∗(R) be the unique preferred levels of public spending for D
and R voters, respectively, where g∗(D) > g∗(R). It follows directly that D and
R candidates always find it optimal to select public spending accordingly4 and
3These are defined fully in the next sections.
4For simplicity, we abstract from strategic incentives in public spending
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measure γsD of voters always vote Democrat, while γ
s
R always vote Republican,
in any presidential election.
The game between incumbents and swing voters5 has two symmetric reputation-
building equilibria, where incumbents choose r strategically in order to swing
either P or F voters to their platform. Which of the two applies depends on the
distribution of swing voters in the electoral college, as is discussed in more detail
in section 2.5. If the incumbent stands to gain from choosing free trade relative
to trade protection, then a protectionist incumbent may have an incentive to
deviate from his preferred policy choice and choose free trade. The focus of our
analysis is the converse case where the distribution of swing voters is such that
the Free-trader incumbent may find it optimal to build a reputation as a pro-
tectionist. Note that the incentives for Republican and Democrat incumbents
are symmetric, since the incentives for trade policy choice hinge on the extent
to which free-trader incumbents of either party can improve their re-election
probability through trade protection. Since ideology plays no part in the voting
decisions of swing voters, the eﬀects are symmetric for D and R incumbents.
The trade policy game is solved by backward induction, starting from the
incentives of any politician facing a binding term limit. For any distribution
of ideologists and single-issue voters across the electoral college, an incumbent
politician in his second term of oﬃce has no incentive to choose a trade policy
that conflicts with his personal views, since he can never be re-elected. Hence,
incumbents always find it optimal to implement their preferred trade policy in
their final term of oﬃce.
Over the next sections we derive the conditions under which the following
strategies constitute an equilibrium of the trade policy game in incumbents’ first
term of oﬃce: free-trader incumbents deviate from their preferred policy and
implement trade protection in the first term of oﬃce following a low utility cost
draw; protectionist incumbents always implement their preferred policy in the
first term of oﬃce. Furthermore, protectionist voters vote for the incumbent if
trade protection has been implemented in the first term of oﬃce, and for the
challenger otherwise, while free-trader voters vote for the incumbent if trade
protection has not been implemented, and for the challenger otherwise. More-
over, this ‘reputation-building’ equilibrium is unique for distributions6 of swing
voters under which incumbents can expect to improve their re-election chances
through trade protection.
The strategy of a protectionist incumbent is clearly optimal since by imple-
menting trade protection he improves his reelection probability while simulta-
neously setting his preferred policy. Moreover, if a free-trader incumbent draws
a high utility cost c = cH , then he always follows his preferred policy choice,
5The focus of the chapter is the strategic interaction between incumbents and swing voters.
For completeness, a discussion of elections between two untested politicians is included in
Appendix C.
6Appendix B shows this reputation-building equilibrium to be unique for distributions of
swing voters where the measure of protectionists versus free-trader voters, and their distri-
bution across the electoral college is such that incumbents stand to gain from implementing
trade protection in the first term. A symmetric unique equilibrium exists in the case where
incumbents stand to gain through free trade.
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since cH > βζ. The benefits in re-election probability can never outweigh the
costs of a policy change.
In contrast, a draw of cL may induce a free-trader to set r = 1 if protection-
ism suﬃciently increases the proportion of electoral college votes won so as to
alter the election outcome. Since the incumbent’s personal preference over r is
hidden from voters, a free trade incumbent in his first term may have an incen-
tive to build a reputation7 as a protectionist in order to attract protectionist
voters to his platform in the next election. The lack of a credible commitment to
a choice of r implies that pre-election promises carry no weight with single-issue
voters, who recognise that politicians can deviate ex post. The only opportunity
for candidates to convey information to voters regarding their preferences over
trade policy, is through policy decisions made when in power. Voters can up-
date their beliefs on the basis of the incumbent’s historical trade policy decisions
and thus condition their vote on the history of the elections game. It is this
feature of the political agency model that can give rise to strategic behaviour
by political incumbents.
Consider the incentives of swing voters in the election for the period two
presidency, given the policy change strategy of free-trader incumbents described
above. Protectionist and free trade voters maximise their expected payoﬀ by
supporting the candidate with the highest probability of implementing r = 1
and r = 0, respectively, in their second term. Consider a free-trader incumbent
who can improve the probability of winning a majority of electoral college votes
if protectionists support his platform (and free traders support the challenger).
If nature draws cH , the incumbent sets r = 0, thus revealing himself as a free
trader and gaining the support of γsF voters in all states over the continuum.
Protectionists support the challenger who is a free-trader with probability 1−π.
If cL is drawn, the D free-trader incumbent strategically sets r = 1 to build a
reputation as a protectionist.
The observed first-term trade policy choice provides voters with information
with which they update their beliefs about the preferences of the incumbent.
Let eπ denote the updated probability, derived from Bayes’ rule, where:
eπ = Pr(r = 1 in 2nd term | r = 1 in 1st term)
=
Pr(r = 1 in 2nd term) Pr(r = 1 in 1st term | r = 1 in 2nd term)
Pr(r = 1 in 1st term)
=
π
π + (1− π)p (3)
Since politicians set their preferred trade policy when the term limit is bind-
ing, the probability that trade protection is set in the second term is the proba-
bility that any randomly selected politician is a protectionist, i.e. π. Moreover,
if the incumbent protects in his second term, he is revealed to be a protectionist
7Besley and Case (1995) as well as List and Sturm (2006) examine how term limits change
the incentives of politicians to build a reputation, with significant eﬀects on policy choice. In
this chapter, the optimality of a reputation building strategy depends on both the measure
and distribution of P voters relative to F voters across states in the electoral college.
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and thus protects in the first term with probability 1. The probability that the
industry in question is protected in the incumbent’s first term in oﬃce is the
composite probability of being a protectionist, π, or being a free trader who had
low cost draw, (1− π)p.
Swing voters contrast eπ, the updated probability of the incumbent being
a protectionist, with the probability that a randomly selected challenger sets
r = 1 in his first term of oﬃce. For a suﬃciently small value8 for p, first term
protectionism is a suﬃciently strong signal of protectionist preferences, so that:
eπ > π + (1− π)p (4)
For the rest of the paper we assume p is suﬃciently small to satisfy con-
dition (4) so as to ensure that γsP support the incumbent government if trade
protection is implemented in the first term, while γsF voters support the chal-
lenger, given politicians’ strategies in equilibrium. The optimality of swing
voters’ re-election strategies is confirmed in Appendix A, where these are shown
to maximise voters’ value functions, given politicians’ strategies.
The next section examines how a shift from free trade in the first term of
oﬃce aﬀects the incumbent’s probability of winning a majority in any state
s, given its characteristics. State level probability changes are translated into
electoral college votes that in turn allow the change in probability of re-election
to be derived. We examine incentives for trade protection and confirm that
politicians’ and voters’ strategies constitute a Markov Perfect equilibrium of
the game.
2.3 Trade Policy and State-Level Majority
Recall that in each state s,
P
k
γsk = 1. Let ω
s
p = (γ
s
D − γsR) represent the
lead of the D candidate in state s, referred to as the ‘political lead’, and ωst =
(γsP − γsF ) represent the excess of P voters relative to F voters, referred to as
the ‘trade policy lead’. A state with a larger proportion of Republican voters
than Democrat voters has a negative political lead, while a state with a larger
proportion of free trade supporters relative to protectionists has a negative trade
policy lead.
Let ρs|r=0 denote the probability that the incumbent wins a majority in state
s given free trade in the first term, and ρs|r=1 if trade protection is implemented.
Given voters’ strategies, protectionists vote for the incumbent if trade protection
is implemented in the first term of oﬃce and for the challenger otherwise, and
vice versa for free-trader voters.
Consider a Democrat incumbent in his first term of oﬃce. Consider the
implications of switching from free-trade to trade protection in his first term
8List and Sturm (2006) identify two conflicting eﬀects. Applied to our trade policy game,
these are: first, an incentive eﬀect that follows from the term limit assumption that lowers
the probability of r = 1 in the second term, since a free-trader will set r = 0 with certainty;
and second, a selection eﬀect that raises the likelihood of r = 1, since re-elected politicians in
their second term of oﬃce are more likely to be protectionist. The size of p determines which
of the two eﬀects dominates.
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of oﬃce on the probability of winning a majority in state s. The D incumbent
gains γsD+γ
s
F+ν
s by setting r = 0 in his first term, while the R challenger gains
the remaining votes. The incumbent wins a majority of votes in state s, given
r = 0, if γsD + γ
s
F + ν
s > γsR + γ
s
P − νs, that implies εs must exceed ωst − ωsp. If
the D incumbent sets r = 1, he gains γsD + γ
s
P + ν
s and the remaining γsR + γ
s
F
−νsare gained by the R challenger. Hence, a majority in state s is won if εs
exceeds −ωst − ωsp. It follows from the distribution9 of εs that:
ρs|r=0 = Pr
¡
εs > ωst − ωsp
¢
= H
¡
ωsp − ωst
¢
(5)
ρs|r=1 = Pr
¡
εs > −ωst − ωsp
¢
= H
¡
ωsp + ω
s
t
¢
(6)
Now consider the probabilities ρs|r=0 and ρ
s
|r=1 for a Republican incumbent.
The R incumbent gains γsR + γ
s
F − νs by setting r = 0 in his first term, while
the D challenger gains the remaining votes. A majority is won by R in state s
if γsR+ γ
s
F − νs > γsD + γsP + νs, that is, if εs < −
¡
ωst + ω
s
p
¢
. If the Republican
sets r = 1 in his first term, he gains γsR + γ
s
P − νs and the remaining γsD + γsF
+νsare gained by the D challenger. A majority in state s is won if εs < ωst−ωsp.
An R incumbent’s probability of majority can thus be expressed by as:
ρs|r=0 = Pr
¡
εs < −ωst − ωsp
¢
= 1−H
¡
ωsp + ω
s
t
¢
(7)
ρs|r=1 = Pr
¡
εs < ωst − ωsp
¢
= 1−H
¡
ωsp − ωst
¢
(8)
Let ∆ρs = ρs|r=1 − ρs|r=0 denote the change in the probability of winning a
majority in s through trade protection. Combining (5) and (6), as well as (7)
and (8), yields that ∆ρs = H
¡
ωsp + ω
s
t
¢
− H
¡
ωsp − ωst
¢
for both a Democrat
incumbent and a Republican incumbent. The incentives for trade policy im-
plementation are thus symmetric for incumbents of either party. Furthermore,
symmetry of h(εs) allows ∆ρs to be summarised by:
∆ρs = H
¡¯¯
ωsp
¯¯
+ ωst
¢
−H
¡¯¯
ωsp
¯¯
− ωst
¢
(9)
Equation (9) shows that the impact of the implementation of first term
trade protection by an incumbent, of either party, on the probability of that
incumbent winning a majority in state s depends on two factors. First, the
absolute value of the political lead,
¯¯
ωsp
¯¯
, that reflects the degree of electoral
competition in state s, and second, the trade policy lead, ωst , the reflects the
‘swingness’ of state s, as measured by the diﬀerence between protectionist voters
and free-trader voters.
9Voter turnout across US states has been repeatedly found to be positively correlated
with the closeness of electoral competition (Geys, 2006, Matsusaka, 1993, Cox and Munger,
1989). This suggests that the state-specific turnout shock may plausibly depend on ωs. For
simplicity and so as to be able to characterise the political equilibrium, we abstract from
this and maintain the assumption of independently and identically distributed state-specific
shocks.
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For any given level of electoral competition, the magnitude and sign of ωst
determine the extent to which trade policy can ‘swing’ the state in the incum-
bent’s favour. If γsP > γ
s
F , then deviating from free-trade to trade protection
improves the incumbent’s probability of a majority, so ∆ρs > 0. Conversely, if
γsP < γ
s
F then an incumbent of either party worsens the probability of winning
a majority of votes in s, so ∆ρs < 0. Finally, if P and F voters have equal
measure in state s, then ωst = 0 and trade policy has no power in altering elec-
toral outcomes for state s. Moreover, the greater the trade policy lead (lag), the
greater the impact on the probability of a majority in s.
For a given trade policy lead, ωst , the closer is electoral competition between
the candidates, the larger the impact of the existing swing voters on ∆ρs. To
see why this is the case, consider that distribution h (εs) is symmetric around 0
and single-peaked. For a given ωst , as
¯¯
ωsp
¯¯
→ 0, the probability gain is from the
centre of the distribution, implying a larger ∆ρs.
The pair of leads,
¡
ωsp, ω
s
t
¢
, therefore provides a complete description of state
s, in terms of assessing the probability of it being won by either candidate. The
discussion has shown that in states where γsP > γ
s
F the incumbent stands to
improve the probability of winning a majority, while chances are worsened in
states where γsP < γ
s
F . States where γ
s
P = γ
s
F are neutral to the trade policy
decision. In a multi-jurisdictional setting, the implications of the trade policy
decision for incumbents’ overall re-election probability depends crucially on the
distribution of trade policy and political leads across states in the electoral
college. If some states have more P than F voters, and others the converse,
the incumbent stands to worsen his chances of winning certain electoral college
votes and improve the probability of winning others. The next section turns to
the question of aggregation of these eﬀects and characterises the probability of
the incumbent winning the election overall.
2.4 Trade Policy in the Electoral College
Section 2.3 establishes how the trade policy lead and degree of electoral com-
petition in a state determine how the incumbent’s first term policy decision
alters his subsequent probability of winning the electoral college vote of that
state. This section examines how the distribution of state probability changes,
∆ρs, arising from pairs of leads
¡
ωsp, ω
s
t
¢
, can be translated into a measure of
electoral college votes. The conditions under which reputation-building occurs
in the political equilibrium are then characterised.
The law of large numbers implies that if each state along a continuum is
subject to an identically distributed and independent shock εs described by a
particular distribution, h (εs), then the distribution of realised shocks over the
infinite number of states along the continuum is exactly described by h (εs).
This implies that if all states over a continuum have identical
¯¯
ωsp
¯¯
and ωst ,
then ∆ρs = H
¡¯¯
ωsp
¯¯
+ ωst
¢
− H
¡¯¯
ωsp
¯¯
− ωst
¢
not only describes the change in
the incumbent’s probability of winning the electoral college vote of each state
s, but also describes the change in electoral college votes actually won over the
continuum of unit length.
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There is no aggregate uncertainty, despite the individual uncertainty re-
flected in the state-specific shocks, as a result of the infinite nature of states along
the continuum. It follows that in the absence of an additional national shock,
there is no aggregate uncertainty over the continuum and election outcomes can
be predicted deterministically for diﬀerent policy choices. To add smoothness
to our results, and capture the uncertainty of election outcomes, we introduce
aggregate uncertainty in the model through the national pro-incumbent shock
η, distributed by f (η) . The distribution of shock η is assumed to be symmetric
around 0 and single-peaked, and distributed over a suﬃciently wide support so
that no candidate can be certain of a majority of electoral college votes.
To apply the law of large numbers and be able to convert changes in proba-
bility into changes in electoral college votes won, it must be the case that
¯¯
ωsp
¯¯
and ωst are identical for all states over the continuum. Assuming all states are
identical, however, removes all interesting eﬀects that can arise from having
a non-uniform distribution of
¯¯
ωsp
¯¯
and ωst . We thus choose to ‘discretise’ the
continuum into N state ‘types’, each forming a sub-continuum of the overall
continuum of states. States of a given type have identical
¯¯
ωsp
¯¯
and ωst , but
states from diﬀerent types may diﬀer in their characteristics. Since there are
infinitely many states in a continuum of small measure and a continuum of large
measure, it follows that we can apply the law of large numbers on a type-by-
type basis. Hence the analysis is facilitated greatly through the assumption of a
continuum of states, while the discretization of the continuum into types allows
us to investigate the role of voter distribution in a tractable way.
Let there be N state types, denoted by n, where n = {1, 2, ..., N}. All
states of a given type are assumed to be identical in terms of their degree of
electoral competition
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
and the trade policy lead ωnt . Let φn ≥ 0 denote the
proportion of states s that are of type n, such that
PN
n=1 φn = 1. Moreover,
suppose state types are ranked in declining
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
such that
¯¯
ωjp
¯¯
≥
¯¯
ωkp
¯¯
, where
k > j and k, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Further assume ¯¯ω1p¯¯ ≤ 1 and ¯¯ωNp ¯¯ ≥ 0.
The ranking of discrete state types over the continuum implies that the
distribution of |ωp| across the electoral college is a step function, as illustrated
in figure (1). The distribution of states across the electoral college can be
changed through (i) the relative weight of state types in the electoral college
through φn, (ii) the finite number of types N , and (iii) the distribution of
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
.
Let ∆vn denote the change in electoral college votes of type n won by the
incumbent as a result of implementing trade protection in his first term. More-
over, let ∆v =
PN
n=1 ∆v
n denote the total change in electoral college votes
over the whole continuum of states from a deviation from preferred trade pol-
icy in the first term. For any state of type n, the change in the incumbent’s
probability of winning a majority by deviating from free trade is ∆ρn, where
∆ρn = H
¡¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
+ ωnt
¢
−H
¡¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
− ωnt
¢
. It follows from the law of large num-
bers that φn∆ρ
n gives the change in electoral college votes of type n won by
the incumbent. Aggregating over all state types yields:
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|ωp|
10
s
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φ1 φN φn
|ω1p|
|ωnp|
|ωNp|
Figure 1: Representation of N state types in the continuum.
∆v =
NX
n=1
∆vn =
NX
n=1
φn∆ρ
n (10)
It follows from (10) that ∆v is a weighted sum of the state type probability
changes. The incumbent may gain or lose electoral college votes from setting r =
1 depending on sign and magnitude of ∆ρn for each state type, and the weight
of that state type in the electoral college, given by φn. If the characteristics and
distribution of state types are such that ∆v < 0 overall, then the free-trader
incumbent cannot improve his chances of re-election through the implementation
of trade policy and always selects r = 0 in his first term. The reputation building
equilibrium described in section 2.2 requires that ∆v > 0, so that free-trader
incumbents gain from the shift from free trade. As discussed, there are two
symmetric reputation-building equilibria, where ∆v > 0 and where ∆v < 0,
respectively. We focus on the former, where free-trader incumbents may have an
incentive to implement trade protection. In the latter, a protectionist incumbent
may choose to build a reputation as a free-trader by abstaining from trade
protection in his first term. We return to this issue in the next section where
we examine how a redistribution of swing voters gives results in a shift from one
equilibrium to another.
It is appealing to interpret ∆v in (10) as the change in electoral college
votes when there are N states (rather than N measures of states), each with φn
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electoral college votes, where ∆ρn represents the change in the probability of
winning the electoral college votes of state n. This interpretation is intuitive but
important conceptual diﬀerences exist between the discrete state interpretation
and the continuous measures of states assumed in the model. Under a discrete
state interpretation, the electoral votes of a state n, are won or lost as a block
φn, while in the continuous measures of state types imply that proportions of
votes φn are won or lost. Hence, with a continuum of states, ∆v reflects the
actual change in electoral college votes won by the incumbent, not the expected
change in electoral college votes.
Recall that u is the pro-incumbent shock in electoral college votes won.
Moreover, let vrI denote the electoral college votes won by the incumbent when
he sets trade policy r in his first term of oﬃce. Similarly, vrC denote those won
by the challenger, given r. Let ωrv = (v
r
I − vrC) denote the incumbent’s lead over
the challenger in the electoral college, given r, where ωrv can take values between
−1 and 1 and reflects the degree of electoral competition at the national level.
For the incumbent to be re-elected, given r, it must be the case that vrI +
u > vrC − u. Hence, 2u = η must exceed vrC − vrI . Finally, let θ
r denote the
incumbent’s probability of re-election, given trade policy selection r in the first
term of oﬃce. Given distribution F (η) probabilities θ0 and θ1 can be expressed
as:
θ0 = Pr
¡
η > v0C − v0I
¢
= 1− F
¡
v0C − v0I
¢
= F
¡
ω0v
¢
(11)
θ1 = Pr
¡
η > v1C − v1I
¢
= 1− F
¡
v1C − v1I
¢
= F
¡
ω1v
¢
(12)
Since ∆v reflects the change in electoral college votes won by the incumbent
from a policy shift, it follows that v1I = v
0
I + ∆v and v
1
C = v
0
C − ∆v. Hence,
ω1v = v
1
I − v1C = v0I − v0C + 2∆v = ω0v + 2∆v. The re-election probabilities can
thus be re-written as:
θ0 = F
¡
ω0v
¢
(13)
θ1 = F
¡
ω0v + 2∆v
¢
(14)
Defining ∆θ as the change in re-election probability from a policy shift, it
follows directly from (13) and (14) that ∆θ = θ1−θ0 = F
¡
ω0v + 2∆v
¢
−F
¡
ω0v
¢
.
Furthermore, symmetry of f(η) allows ∆θ to be summarised by:
∆θ = F
¡¯¯
ω0v
¯¯
+ 2∆v
¢
− F
¡¯¯
ω0v
¯¯¢
(15)
It follows from (15) that the incumbent enjoys an improvement in reelection
probability (∆θ > 0) from the implementation of trade protection provided
there is an overall gain in electoral college votes from the policy (∆v > 0). If
∆v > 0, then the expected payoﬀ from implementing trade protection in the
first term is (∆θ)βζ for a free-trader incumbent of either party. For r = 1 to
be an optimal strategy, the expected payoﬀ must exceed the incumbent’s utility
cost draw. Since (∆θ)βζ < βζ and cH > βζ, the analysis confirms that a free-
trader incumbent with a high utility cost draw never finds it optimal to deviate
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from free trade. If a low utility cost cL is drawn, then (∆θ)βζ must be larger
than cL for the reputation-building strategy to be optimal.
In the symmetric equilibrium where ∆v < 0, a protectionist incumbent
improves his re-election probability by setting r = 0 in his first term. Since
∆θ is defined as the change in re-election probability from a policy shift, then
∆θ = θ0−θ1 > 0. If the expected payoﬀ exceeds cL then his reputation-building
strategy is optimal.
Proposition 1 If (∆θ)βζ > cL, then there is a unique equilibrium in which
incumbent politicians with a low utility cost draw (cL) deviate from their pre-
ferred trade policy in their first term of oﬃce if this increases their re-election
probability and follow their private preferences otherwise.
Proof. It follows from (9) that ∆ρn = H
¡¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
+ ωnt
¢
− H
¡¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
− ωnt
¢
is
the change in the probability of winning the electoral college vote of a state of
type n. The resulting change in type n electoral college votes won is φn∆ρ
n.
Aggregating over state types gives the total change in electoral college votes from
a policy shift, ∆v =
PN
n=1 φn∆ρ
n. If ∆v > 0, then a free-trader incumbent of
either party enjoys a gain in re-election probability ∆θ from setting r = 1 in
his first term of oﬃce. Provided a low cost is drawn and (∆θ)βζ > cL, the F
incumbent enjoys a positive net expected payoﬀ from setting r = 1, so finds
it optimal to deviate from his preferred private policy. If a high utility cost
cH is drawn by an F incumbent or the gain in re-election probability ∆θ is
not suﬃciently large for (∆θ)βζ > cL to be satisfied, then the incumbent sets
his preferred policy, free trade. In this equilibrium, a protectionist incumbent
cannot increase his re-election probability through a policy shift, so always finds
it optimal to follow his private preferences and set r = 1.
Conversely, if ∆v < 0, then a protectionist incumbent of either party enjoys
a gain in re-election probability ∆θ from setting r = 0 in his first term of oﬃce.
Provided a low cost is drawn and (∆θ)βζ > cL, the P incumbent enjoys a
positive net expected payoﬀ from setting r = 0, so finds it optimal to deviate
from his preferred private policy. If a high utility cost cH is drawn by a P
incumbent or the gain in re-election probability ∆θ is not suﬃciently large for
(∆θ)βζ > cL to be satisfied, then the incumbent sets his preferred policy, trade
protection. In this equilibrium, a free-trader incumbent cannot increase his re-
election probability through a policy shift, so always finds it optimal to follow
his private preferences and set r = 1.
For a given distribution of voters in the electoral college, and thus given ∆v,
the equilibrium in which reputation-building forms part of incumbent’s optimal
strategies is the unique equilibrium. A proof of uniqueness can be found in
Appendix B.
Inspection of (15) reveals that the reputation-building equilibrium depends
on two key national-level parameters of the model. First, the closeness of elec-
toral competition at the national level, as measured by
¯¯
ω0v
¯¯
and second, the
gain in electoral college votes ∆v from a policy shift. The characteristics of
f(η) imply that a closer degree of electoral competition between candidates at
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the national level, the greater the probability gain from an increase in electoral
college votes from a policy shift.
Intuitively, the closer the competition between the two candidates, that is
the smaller is
¯¯
ω0v
¯¯
, then the more likely it is that the pro-incumbent shock
perturbs the election outcome. Since the pro-incumbent shock is more likely to
be near 0, a given gain in electoral college votes through a strategic trade policy
decision is more beneficial the closer
¯¯
ω0v
¯¯
is to 0.
Conversely, relatively weak electoral competition, reflected by high
¯¯
ω0v
¯¯
,
implies that one of the candidates has a large lead in electoral college votes over
the other. The probability that a suﬃciently large shock is realised to change the
election outcome is relatively low. A gain∆v implies a smaller shock is suﬃcient
to change the election result, but the further from 0 is the initial diﬀerence in
electoral college votes, the smaller the associated gain in probability.
Furthermore, for any given degree of national electoral competition, the
greater the increase in electoral college votes ∆v that can be won through a
policy shift, the greater is the incumbent’s gain in re-election probability. Intu-
itively, the more votes that can be ‘swung’ at the national level from trade policy,
the larger the impact of the trade policy decision on re-election probability.
A change in either
¯¯
ω0v
¯¯
or ∆v has an impact on re-election probability ∆θ
and thus on the likelihood that condition10 (∆θ)βζ > cL is satisfied. These
results are summarised in proposition (2).
Proposition 2 An increase in the number of electoral college votes that can be
won by deviating from preferred trade policy (∆v) or an increase in electoral
competition at the national level (lower
¯¯
ω0v
¯¯
) make reputation-building through
the strategic selection of trade policy more likely.
Proof. Consider a distribution of voters such that∆v > 0. It follows directly
from ∆θ = F
¡¯¯
ω0v
¯¯
+ 2∆v
¢
− F
¡¯¯
ω0v
¯¯¢
that an increase in ∆v, ceteris paribus,
increases the change in the incumbent’s re-election probability from the imple-
mentation of trade protection. Moreover, since f(η) is symmetric around 0 and
single-peaked, ∆θ increases as
¯¯
ω0v
¯¯
→ 0. A higher ∆θ from either increase
makes it more likely that condition (∆θ)βζ > cL is satisfied, and thus that
reputation building takes place.
Propositions (1) and (2) confirm the same properties apply in the multi-
jurisdictional framework as in the related literature with one jurisdiction. Namely,
that there exists a unique reputation-building equilibrium that is more likely the
larger the number of votes that can be swung through a policy decision, and
the closer is electoral competition between candidates.
The multi-jurisdictional framework extends the literature in two ways. First,
the electoral college structure provides new insights into how state-level charac-
teristics in the electoral college combine to influence the incentives for strategic
trade protection at the national level. This provides for a more nuanced anal-
ysis of how swing-voters aﬀect policy decisions. Second, the framework adds a
10An increase in the discounted ego-rent, βζ, or decrease in cL also increase the likelihood
of there being a reputation-building equilibrium.
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spatial dimension that allows distributional eﬀects to be examined in a highly
tractable way. The analysis delivers three new propositions that describe how
the distribution of voters in the electoral college influence trade policy decisions.
These eﬀects are analysed in the next section.
2.5 Distribution of Voters and Electoral Incentives
Section 2.4 establishes that the reputation building equilibrium depends on pa-
rameters,
¯¯
ω0v
¯¯
and ∆v, that contribute to the change in the incumbent’s re-
election probability arising from a first term policy shift. While these national-
level parameters confirm the importance of electoral competition and the change
in electoral college votes won as key determinants, they represent summary
statistics of the underlying state-level characteristics in the electoral college.
Expressing ∆θ in terms of state-level parameters gives rise to proposition (3).
Proposition 3 The likelihood of strategic trade policy implementation depends
on the distribution of swing voters and ideologists within states of a given type
(
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
, ωnt ), the distribution of state types in the electoral college (φn) and the
probability distributions of state-level (H(εs)) and national shocks (F (η)).
Proof. Consider the change in re-election probability summarised by (15).
Recall that ∆v =
PN
n=1 φn∆ρ
n. This can be expressed in terms of state-level
characteristics by substituting for ∆ρn. This yields:
∆v =
NP
n=1
φn∆ρ
n =
NP
n=1
φn
¡
H
¡¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
+ ωnt
¢
−H
¡¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
− ωnt
¢¢
(16)
Moreover, electoral competition at the national level
¯¯
ω0v
¯¯
=
¯¯
v0I − v0C
¯¯
, where
v0I and v
0
C are the electoral college votes won by the incumbent and challenger,
respectively, under free trade in the first term. v0I is the weighted sum of electoral
college votes won by state type, when r = 0. Thus v0I =
PN
n=1 φnρ
n
|r=0. More-
over, since v0I +v
0
C = 1, it is straightforward to express the challenger’s electoral
college votes as v0C = 1−
PN
n=1 φnρ
n
|r=0. Combining these allows national-level
electoral competition to be expressed in terms of state-level characteristics:
ω0v = 2
NP
n=1
φnρ
n
|r=0 − 1 = 2
NP
n=1
φnH
¡¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
− ωnt
¢
− 1 (17)
Substituting (16) and (17) into (15) allows the incumbents re-election probabil-
ity to be expressed in terms of state-level variables and distributional parame-
ters:
∆θ = F
¡¯¯
ω1v
¯¯¢
− F
¡¯¯
ω0v
¯¯¢
= F
µ
2
NP
n=1
φnH
¡¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
+ ωnt
¢
− 1
¶
− F
µ
2
NP
n=1
φnH
¡¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
− ωnt
¢
− 1
¶
(18)
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Inspection of (18) shows that the change in re-election probability, and thus the
likelihood of strategic trade policy implementation, hinges on (i) the distribution
of swing voters and ideologists within states of a given type, summarised by¡¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
, ωnt
¢
, (ii) the distribution of state types in the electoral college, reflected
by proportions φn and (iii) the distributions of state-level and national-level
shocks, H(εs) and F (η).
To show how the spatial position of swing voters can influence policy de-
cisions, we consider two redistribution experiments that satisfy the following
conditions:
1. The aggregate population of each voter type in the electoral college is kept
constant. In particular, if we let Γk denote the total measure of k voters
in the electoral college, then the distribution of k voters across n state
types, as reflected by γnk , must satisfy the following condition:
Γk =
NP
n=1
φnγ
n
k , where k ∈ {D,R,F, P} (19)
2. All states always have a unit measure of voters, so
P
k γ
n
k = 1. This
implies that an increase in the measure of voters of a particular type in
a state, must be accompanied by a decrease in voters of some other type.
Denoting the total measure of voters by Γ, conditions 1 and 2 imply that
the total measure of voters in the electoral college must be 1:
Γ =
P
k
Γk =
P
k
P
n
φnγ
n
k =
P
n
φn
P
k
γnk = 1 (20)
3. Feasibility constraints regarding pairs of values
¡
ωnp , ω
n
t
¢
for all state types
n are adhered to. To see how these apply, consider pair
¡¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
, ωnt
¢
that
describes states of type n. Since the sum of all voter types is 1 in each
state, there is a finite range of values that leads ωnp and ω
n
t may feasibly
take. In particular, the larger is the lead in any one dimension, the smaller
the scope for variability in the lead in the other dimension. For example,
if ωnp = 1 (or −1), then a state of type n is made up entirely of D voters
(or R voters) so ωnt = 0. At the other extreme, ω
n
t = 1 (or −1) implies¯¯
ωsp
¯¯
= 0. Figure (2) illustrates the set of all feasible combinations of¡
ωnp , ω
n
t
¢
, given
P
k
γnk = 1. Consider
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
= α. This implies that D voters
exceed R voters by α, or vice versa. For example, suppose γnD = 0.4
and γnR = 0.2, in states of type n, implying a Democratic lead ω
n
p = 0.2.
The sum of ideologists is 0.6, so the swing voters represent 0.4 of each
state. If all swing voters are protectionist, then ωnt = 0.4, while if all are
free-traders, then ωnt = −0.4. Suppose instead that ωnp = 0.2 arises from
γnD = 0.3 and γ
n
R = 0.1. In this case, ω
n
t ranges from −0.5 to 0.5. It is
straightforward to see that if there are no R voters at all, then ωnt ranges
from −0.8 to 0.8. This gives the largest possible range consistent with
ωnp = γ
n
D = 0.2. Similar reasoning applies for a state where ω
n
p = −0.2.
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In general, the maximum measure of single-issue voters consistent with¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
= α is 1− α. Hence, the maximum trade policy lead is ωnt = 1− α,
where all swing voters are protectionists. Conversely, the minimum trade
policy lead consistent with
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
= α is ωst = α − 1, where all single-issue
voters are free-traders. These maximum and minimum leads form the
rhombus in figure (2). States with positive measures of all voter types are
described by
¡
ωnp , ω
n
t
¢
that lie inside the rhombus. The discussion can be
summarised by the following range for ωnt , given
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
:
ωnt ∈ [α− 1, 1− α] , if
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
= α,where α ∈ [0, 1] (21)
Any redistribution of voters across state types must be consistent with
(21).
The analysis in the paper up to this point has been concerned with politi-
cians’ optimal strategies for a given distribution of voters. The two redistribu-
tion experiments in this section address a diﬀerent set of questions. In particular,
how a change in the spatial location of a measure of swing voters can alter the
electoral incentives for trade protection of a given industry, whether through
variation in the degree of state-level competition across the electoral college,
or through institutional parameters, such as variation in the contribution of
electoral votes of diﬀerent state types in the electoral college. While we model
the redistribution as a physical migration of voters with fixed preferences, this
need not be the case. Preferences of voters may change in a given location,
without migration, through changes in the pattern of industrial concentration
and employment. The experiments reveal two key distributional determinants
of electoral incentives. First, state ‘swingness’, as measured by the closeness of
state-level electoral competition, and second, state ‘decisiveness’, as measured
by the proportion of electoral college votes represented by states of a given type.
Let us define the initial distribution of swing voters prior to any redistri-
bution. This is referred to as the ‘benchmark distribution’ in the rest of the
section. Suppose the N state types are ranked such that 1 >
¯¯
ω1p
¯¯
> .. >
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
>
.. >
¯¯
ωNp
¯¯
> 0. Condition (21) implies that the maximum measure of single-
issue voters in states of type n consistent with
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
is 1 −
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
. Assume the
maximum feasible measure of single-issue voters is present in all states of types
n. It follows that the measure of swing voters is increasing with n since
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
is decreasing with n. Further assume that in the benchmark distribution, the
swing voters of each state of type n are split evenly between P and F voters,
such that γnP = γ
n
F =
1
2
£
1−
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯¤
. This implies that for each state of type
n, ωnt = 0, thereby placing the distribution of state types along the ωp axis in
Figure (2). Hence, by construction, the benchmark distribution is characterised
by ∆ρn = ∆vn = 0, ∀n, and thus ∆v = ∆θ = 0, so trade policy has no impact
on re-election probability. The conditions for a reputation-building equilibrium
are not satisfied under the benchmark distribution so all incumbents set their
preferred trade policy in their first term of oﬃce.
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Figure 2: Feasible pairs of political and trade leads.
2.5.1 Redistribution A - ‘Swingness’
From the benchmark distribution, consider a redistribution of P and F voters
that increases the concentration of protectionist voters in states with relatively
low
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
, and vice versa for free-traders. The additional assumption is made that
all state types contribute equally to the electoral college11 , such that φn = φ, ∀n.
Under these assumptions and provided the redistribution satisfies conditions (1)
to (3), the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4 A redistribution of protectionist voters from states with weaker
electoral competition (higher
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
) to states with stronger electoral competition
(lower
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
) makes it more likely that incumbents engage in strategic trade pro-
tection.
Proof. Starting from the initial distribution where there are 12
£
1−
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯¤
protectionists and free traders in each state of type n, and state types are
ranked in decreasing
¯¯
ωnp
¯¯
, it follows by construction that if a positive measure
k ≤ 12
£
1−
¯¯
ωip
¯¯¤
of protectionist voters is redistributed from each state of type
i to each state of type j, where i < j, then:
(i) there are suﬃcient free-trader voters in each state of type j to replace the k
voters redistributed to j from state i, since 12
£
1−
¯¯
ωip
¯¯¤
< 12
£
1−
¯¯
ωjp
¯¯¤
.
11This simplifying assumption controls for the eﬀects on reputation-building incentives aris-
ing from diﬀerent state-type contributions of electoral college votes.
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(ii) this exchange of swing voters redistributes P voters towards a measure of
states with a closer electoral competition and F voters towards states with
weaker electoral competition.
In each j state, the measure of protectionists rises by k and the measure of free
traders falls by k, hence ωjt = γ
j
P − γ
j
F = 2k > 0. Conversely, in each state i,
ωit = γ
i
P − γiF = −2k < 0. For all states of type n, where n 6= {i, j}, ωnt = 0.
Consider the eﬀects of a deviation from free trade by an incumbent in his first
term of oﬃce post-redistribution. For states of type i and j, the change in a
free-trader incumbent’s probability of winning a majority from setting r = 1 in
his first term are:
∆ρj = H
¡¯¯
ωjp
¯¯
+ 2k
¢
−H
¡¯¯
ωjp
¯¯
− 2k
¢
> 0 (22)
∆ρi = H
¡¯¯
ωip
¯¯
− 2k
¢
−H
¡¯¯
ωip
¯¯
+ 2k
¢
< 0 (23)
It follows from (22) and (23) that setting r = 1 improves the incumbent’s
probability of winning j state electoral college votes, where P voters exceed F ,
but worsens his chances of winning i state electoral votes where the opposite is
the case. The overall change in electoral college votes is given by:
∆v = φ∆ρi + φ∆ρj + φ
P
n6=i,j
∆ρn = φ
¡
∆ρi +∆ρj
¢
(24)
= φ
£
H
¡¯¯
ωjp
¯¯
+ 2k
¢
−H
¡¯¯
ωjp
¯¯
− 2k
¢¤
− φ
£
H
¡¯¯
ωip
¯¯
+ 2k
¢
−H
¡¯¯
ωip
¯¯
− 2k
¢¤
> 0
Since
¯¯
ωip
¯¯
>
¯¯
ωjp
¯¯
, it follows from the characteristics of h (εn) that the change in
electoral college votes won by the incumbent increases, from 0 in the benchmark
distribution, to∆v > 0. It follows that from having no eﬀect on re-election prob-
ability under the benchmark distribution, the redistribution of protectionists to
states with closer electoral competition increases their relative importance in
the electoral college, giving rises to an improvement in re-election probability
through first term trade protection. Thus an increase in the concentration of
protectionists in states with closer electoral competition makes strategic trade
protection by incumbents more likely.
The redistribution considered has the dual eﬀect of giving protectionists a
lead in one group of states, and free-traders a lead in another group of states,
where both groups have equal measure. It is the closeness of electoral compe-
tition in the former group of states that gives protectionists a greater weight
in the overall assessment of the change in electoral college votes and thus in
re-election probability. If the degree of electoral competition were the same in
the two state types, then these probability changes would entirely oﬀset each
other. It is the diﬀerence in the ‘swingness’ of states across which redistribution
takes place that drives the electoral incentives to implement trade protection
after the redistribution.
A symmetric redistribution that gives free-traders a lead in groups of states
that are more competitive has the opposite eﬀect, such that ∆v < 0 holds
post-redistribution. This corresponds to the symmetric reputation-building
equilibrium where protectionist incumbents override their protectionist views
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and choose free-trade in their first term following a low cost draw. Thus a
population-preserving redistribution of swing voters can generate either of the
two symmetric reputation-building equilibria.
Intuitively, the preferences of concentrations of swing voters that contribute
most in probability terms to election outcomes are given more weight by in-
cumbents when making policy decisions. Moreover, the concentrations that
contribute most are those in swing states whose electoral outcome is most un-
certain.
2.5.2 Redistribution B - ‘Decisiveness’
From the benchmark distribution, consider a redistribution of protectionists
from states of type i to states of type j, where both states types are characterised
by the same degree of electoral competition, but where j states represent a
larger proportion of electoral college votes than do i states. The assumption
that
¯¯
ωip
¯¯
=
¯¯
ωjp
¯¯
= |ωp| controls for the ‘swingness’ eﬀect, while φj > φi isolates
the eﬀect of distributing swing voters across larger or smaller measures of swing
states. Suppose that all states of type n, where n 6= {i, j} remain unchanged.
Starting from ωit = ω
j
t = 0, the redistribution described has the eﬀect of
concentrating a measure of F voters over a smaller measure of swing states, i,
while the same volume of P voters is spread evenly over a larger measure of
states, j, with an identical degree of electoral competitiveness. This gives rise
to two conflicting eﬀects on the electoral incentives for trade protection. On the
one hand, the relatively large concentration of free-traders in i states implies
that a first term protectionist policy reduces the incumbent’s probability of
winning a majority in each state i by more than the probability gain in winning
a majority in each state j, where protectionists are less concentrated. On the
other hand, j states represent a larger measure of electoral college votes than i
states.
Whether the former ‘concentration eﬀect’ or the latter ‘decisiveness eﬀect’
dominates determines whether the redistribution increases or decreases the elec-
toral college votes won overall by setting r = 1 in the first term of oﬃce. If
∆v > 0 overall, then trade protection is more likely than under the benchmark
distribution of swing voters. Otherwise, ∆v < 0 and the symmetric reputation-
building equilibrium is more likely.
The decisiveness eﬀect dominates the concentration eﬀect when the degree
of electoral competition is strong in states i and j. Intuitively, the greater
the swingness of states, the greater the impact in probability terms of even
a small lead in protectionist swing voters. Thus the gain in electoral college
votes from trade protection is larger, ceteris paribus, when a given measure of
protectionist voters is spread over a large measure of highly swing states, than
when concentrated over a smaller measure of identical states. Conversely, a
small protectionist lead has less potency when electoral competition is weak
than when electoral competition is strong, causing the concentration eﬀect to
outweigh the decisiveness eﬀect such that the more concentrated F voters in
states of type i have a larger impact on electoral college votes won than the
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less concentrated P voters in type j states, under first term strategic trade
protection.
Proposition 5 A redistribution of protectionist voters from swing states that
constitute a smaller proportion of electoral college votes (lower φ) to swing states
that constitute a larger proportion of electoral college votes (higher φ) makes it
more likely that incumbents engage in strategic trade protection.
Proof. Consider state types i and j where
¯¯
ωip
¯¯
=
¯¯
ωjp
¯¯
= |ωp| and φj > φi.
The total population of swing voters over states of type i is φi [1− |ωp|], which is
less than the total population of swing voters over j states, given by φj [1− |ωp|].
Recall that P and F voters are assumed to have equal measure in the benchmark
distribution, such that ΓiP = Γ
i
F =
φi
2 [1− |ωp|] and ΓjP = ΓjF =
φj
2 [1− |ωp|].
Since, by construction, ΓiP < Γ
j
F , any redistribution of protectionist voters from
i to j states is feasible up to ΓiP . Suppose k protectionist voters from each state i
are redistributed evenly across states j. It follows that φik voters are distributed
evenly over φj states. Let λ denote the additional protectionist voters in each
state j , where λ = φiφj k. Moreover, φjλ free-traders are redistributed evenly
across i states. Thus φik = φjλ. Since φj > φi, it follows that λ < k.
In each j state, the measure of protectionist rises and free traders falls by φiφj k.
Hence, ωjt = γ
j
P − γ
j
F = 2k
φi
φj
> 0. Conversely, in each state i, ωit = γ
i
P − γiF =
−2k < 0. For all states of type n, where n 6= {i, j}, ωnt = 0. Consider the eﬀects
of a deviation from free trade by an incumbent in his first term of oﬃce post-
redistribution. For states of type i and j, the change in a free-trader incumbent’s
probability of winning a majority from setting r = 1 in his first term are:
∆ρj = H
µ
|ωp|+ 2k φiφj
¶
−H
µ
|ωp|− 2k φiφj
¶
> 0 (25)
∆ρi = H (|ωp|− 2k)−H (|ωp|+ 2k) < 0 (26)
Since φj > φi, it follows that 2k
φi
φj
< 2k so the protectionist lead in j states
is smaller than the free-trader lead in i states. Inspection of (25) and (26)
reveal that setting r = 1 improves the incumbent’s probability of winning each
j state electoral college vote but worsens his chances of winning each i state
electoral college vote. Moreover, since the degree of electoral competition is the
same across the two state types, it follows that ∆ρj < −∆ρi. This reflects the
‘concentration eﬀect’ of the redistribution of swing voters across state types of
diﬀerent measure. However, φj > φi, so there is also a ‘decisiveness eﬀect’ since
there are more j state than i state electoral college votes. Using λ = k φiφj < k
and φj = φi
k
λ > φi for simplification allows the overall change in electoral
college votes won by the incumbent as a result of first term protectionist to be
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expressed as:
∆v = φi∆ρ
i + φj∆ρ
j +
P
n6=i,j
φn∆ρ
n = φi∆ρ
i + φj∆ρ
j (27)
= φi
k
λ
[H (|ωp|+ 2λ)−H (|ωp|− 2λ)]− φi [H (|ωp|+ 2k)−H (|ωp|− 2k)]
Inspection of (27) reveals the trade-oﬀ between the two conflicting eﬀects. The
first term shows a smaller probability change per j state, with weight φi mag-
nified by kλ as a result of the larger scale of electoral college votes. The second
term shows the larger probability change for i states weighted only by φi. The
characteristics of H (·) imply that ∆v > 0 when electoral competition is suﬃ-
ciently close. Hence, when states i and j are characterised by low |ωp| and thus
a high degree of swingness, the redistribution of protectionist voters across a
measure of more decisive states makes strategic trade protection more likely.
Propositions (4) and (5) provide new insights concerning how the distribu-
tion of voters can influence the decisions of policy makers driven by electoral
incentives. The model emphasizes the diﬀerences between direct and indirect
voting for a presidential candidate by showing how the electoral college sys-
tem places diﬀerent weights on the preferences of swing voters, depending on
their location. The propositions show analytically that incremental distribu-
tional changes between states that alter the distribution of leads within states
can have a significant eﬀect on the incentives for policy implementation.
The propositions show that concentrations of swing voters with a particular
trade policy stance have a larger impact on electoral outcomes when located
in swing states. Moreover, their overall impact on the re-election probability of
incumbents increases if their influence is spread over swing states that constitute
a larger proportion of electoral college votes and are thus more decisive for the
election.
The propositions thus combine to give the overall prediction that the trade
policy preferences of a measure of swing voters are more likely to be satisfied if
these swing voters are concentrated in states that are both swing and decisive
for the election outcome. Since voters with strong views over the protection
of a particular industry are likely to be stakeholders in that industry, whether
employees, entrepreneurs, shareholders etc., the main testable empirical impli-
cation of the model is that industries that are concentrated in swing and decisive
states are more likely to be protected. The next section describes the results of
our empirical investigation using US data that tests for the empirical implication
of the model.
3 Empirical Analysis
This section provides evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that indus-
tries with large concentrations in swing and decisive states are more likely to
be protected. The empirical analysis employs a benchmark test of the “Protec-
tion for Sale” mechanism of Grossman and Helpman (1994) using the empirical
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model and data of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). This baseline consti-
tutes the “state-of-the-art” in empirical political economy of trade. We augment
it with the data necessary to test our hypothesis that industrial concentration
in key political districts is a significant determinant of trade policy. While the
empirical specification does not form a direct test of our model, we present re-
duced form evidence that suggests previous empirical studies of the Grossman
and Helpman (1994) model have omitted variables from their analysis that our
theoretical analysis puts forward as being relevant.
The rest of the section proceeds as follows. First we outline the model and
data of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). Second, we present the data
and method of construction for the measure used to capture the swingness and
decisiveness elements of the model. Finally, our results are described.
3.1 Data and Empirical Specification
The theoretical model developed in section 2 considers how electoral incentives
influence a binary trade policy decision that reflects either free trade or trade
protection. The precise nature of this trade protection instrument is unspecified
in the model, but is distinguished by the discretion the political incumbent is
assumed to have over it.
In practice, unilateral political discretion over trade policy, in particular im-
port tariﬀs, is constrained by multilateral agreements. Import tariﬀs are thus
jointly determined through multilateral trade negotiations rather than the sole
result of a government’s political agenda. Moreover, tariﬀ levels for manufac-
turing products are very low since they have been greatly reduced over last few
decades under the GATT and WTO. In contrast, Non-Tariﬀ Barriers (NTBs)
allow governments to exercise more discretion in trade protection since these
are not regulated to the extent of tariﬀs. For this reason, the literature has
mainly employed coverage ratios for non-tariﬀ barriers as a measure of trade
protection, where these represent the share of products within an industry that
benefit from one or more quantitative or qualitative trade restrictions: quantity-
oriented barriers such as voluntary export restraints and quotas, price-oriented
measures such as antidumping and countervailing duties, and threats of quan-
tity and quality monitoring. We therefore adopt the same approach as in the
related literature12 in considering NTB coverage ratios as our measure of trade
protection. Data on Non-Tariﬀ Barriers for 198313 has been collected by the
UNCTAD14 and combined with data from World Bank tapes15.
The benchmark specification by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) tests
the original “Protection for Sale” equation of Grossman and Helpman (1994),
12Leamer (1990) details the construction of NTB coverage ratios. These have been widely
used, for example, in Leamer (1990), Trefler (1993), Gawande (1998), Lee and Swagel (1997),
Goldberg and Maggi (1997), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Bombardini (2005).
13 Since 1983 is the only year for which NTB data is available, it is not possible to test the
term limit eﬀects predicted by the model.
14UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
15This dataset has been kindly provided by Kishore Gawande.
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reproduced in (28), where ti denotes the protection of industry i, zi is the
inverse of the import penetration ratio, ei is the price elasticity of imports
and Ii describes whether sector i is politically organised and represented by a
lobby. Further, αL represents the proportion of the population that is organised
and α denotes the weight of contributions to the linear welfare function of the
government.
ti
1 + ti
=
Ii − αL
α+ αL
zi
ei
(28)
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) demonstrate that lobbying competition
and lobbying spending have an influence on protection in the US by estimating
a system of three equations, of which only one is relevant to this analysis.
This equation is reproduced in (29), where ti is the coverage ratio for industry
i, zi is the inverse of the import penetration ratio, the share of imports to
total production in sector i, ei is the price elasticity of imports and Ii is a
dummy variable that describes whether the sector is politically organised and
represented by a lobby. Moreover, Z1i includes tariﬀs on intermediate goods
and Z2i includes NTBs on intermediate goods as controls. The error term is
denoted by si.
ti
1 + ti
= γ0 + γ1Ii
zi
ei
+ γ2
zi
ei
+ Z1i + Z2i + si (29)
A simultaneity problem was raised by Trefler (1993). Higher trade protection
is likely to reduce import penetration, as reflected in the following equation, in
which εi is the error term16.
1
zi
= φ
ti
1 + ti
+ εi (30)
Import penetration and trade protection are therefore determined simulta-
neously. In order to correct for the simultaneity bias implied by the system of
equations (29) and (30), an instrumental variables approach is adopted. The
capital-labour ratio interacted with industry dummies and comparative advan-
tage variables (fractions of managers, scientists and unskilled labour per in-
dustry) are used as instruments, as in Trefler (1993). A complete list of the
instruments used is reported in Appendix D. As in Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay (2000), we use a two-stage least-squares estimator, and include for each of
the instruments a linear term, a squared term, and the interactions of the linear
term with, ei ,the price elasticity of imports.
The data used for import penetration ratios for the US are identical to those
used by Trefler (1993). Considered as the most accurate estimate of sector-
level price elasticity of imports, the data was taken originally from Shiells et
al. (1986). The dummy variable, Ii, indicates whether a sector is politically
16Note that coeﬃcient φ is not the same character employed in the theoretical section.
29
organised and is constructed by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) based on
US data from the Federal Election Commission17.
3.2 Measuring Concentration
To test the hypothesis that sectors whose activity is concentrated in US states
with strong electoral competition (‘swingness’) and with the electoral votes to
influence electoral outcomes (‘decisiveness’) are more likely to be protected, we
require a measure to capture this form of geopolitical concentration. We there-
fore construct a measure of this concentration by combining two datasets. The
first dataset allows us to construct the geographical concentration of industries
across US states, based on employment. We use the 1987 Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) for the year 1983, which gives us
state-level employment at the four digit SIC.
The second dataset measures the swingness and decisiveness of electoral
states in the presidential election18 of 1984. Strömberg (2005) develops a prob-
abilistic voting approach to presidential election campaigns and estimates an
approximate measure Qs of the joint probability of a state s being both decisive
in the Electoral College and a swing state with a very close state-level election.
It therefore encompasses the two factors put forward by Propositions (4) and
(5) as being important in determining trade policy. He shows how measure Qs
depends on several factors, such as the variance of national popularity-swings
or the variance of electoral vote distribution, which could be interpreted as the
state level and aggregate level uncertainties in the model of Section 2.
The Q-values are estimated for each presidential election using national and
state-level measures. We use measure Qs, estimated by David Strömberg for the
1984 presidential election for each state, whose mean is 0.02 and that ranges
between a value close to zero and 0.07. The probability of being swing and
decisive is never 0 or 1, reflecting, as in our model, that no state is expected
to be won with certainty. The NTBs in place in 1983 would, according to our
model, be related to the expected swingness and decisiveness for the forthcom-
ing election. This is exactly what the Q1984s measure. At the national level, the
Democrat proportion of the two-party vote share in trial-heat polls, economic
growth, incumbency and incumbent president running for re-election are used.
Moreover, at the state level, the diﬀerence from the national mean of the Demo-
crat proportion of the two-party vote share in the 1980 election, the average
ADA-scores19 of each state’s Congress members the year prior to the election
and the diﬀerence between state and national polls are included.
The well-established Qs measure of Strömberg (2005) constitutes a conve-
nient measure for the reduced form specification as it combines the ‘swingness’
17Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) give a detailed desription of the derivation of this
dummy.
18This data was kindly provided by David Strömberg.
19ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) scores, ranging from 0 to 100, are used as a
measure of legislator ideology.
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of states, reflecting the electoral competitiveness, with ‘decisiveness’, reflecting
the size of states and the necessity of winning a certain number of states to
win the overall election. To check the suitability of this measure, we calculate
the correlation between the Qs for the 1984 presidential election and a state-
industry Herfindahl index in 1983. This is found to be -0.4 (significant at the
1% level), showing that industrial concentration is not directly correlated with
the probability of being swing and decisive.
Since the political data, encapsulated by measure Qs, is constructed at the
state level, while trade protection is measured at the industry level, we use the
BLS dataset to link the two dimensions by creating an industry-specific measure
of swingness and decisiveness, qi. Besides being necessary for the empirical
analysis, it also corresponds to the assumption of our model that employees of a
sector in a state are protectionist swing voters in that state. In order to abstract
from any size eﬀects, we measure the state specialisation of each industry as the
deviation in each state from its mean share of national employment. We can
then compute a 4-digit SIC ‘Qs’ measure, denoted by qi using:
qi = 1000×
SX
s=1
∙
Qs ×
µ
Lis
Ls
− Li
L
¶¸
(31)
where i ∈ I denotes each of the 242 4-digit SIC industries used by Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and s ∈ S denotes each of the 48 continental
states20 . Total US employment is represented by L, while aggregate industry
and state employment are respectively Li and Ls. Industries that constitute a
higher proportion of a state’s employment than their proportion of national em-
ployment, for a given Qs, have a higher qi. Conversely, if an industry constitutes
a lower proportion of a state’s employment than it does of national employment,
then qi is lower. Moreover, for a given proportion of a state’s employment, if the
state has a low joint probability of being both swing and decisive, then qi is low.
Taking the deviation from the mean rather than a pure state level measure of
concentration allows to abstract from the possibility that nationally important
industries will be important in all states. The sum is multiplied by 1000 as
multiplying the probability Qs by a share yields very small numbers.
Table (1) presents the descriptive statistics of this constructed measure,
which show that qi varies widely across industries. This confirms that industrial
concentration through space and in specific swing and decisive states is not uni-
form. We check that our results are robust to excluding outlying observations
of qi. The correlations with other industry characteristics are reported in the
third column of the table. Total employment, labour and skill intensity are not
correlated with qi, demonstrating that larger, or more skill or labour intensive
industries do not systematically concentrate more in states that are more likely
to be swing and decisive.
Augmenting the specification of Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) to
include the constructed industry level swingness and decisiveness variable, qi,
gives the following specification:
20Excluding the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawai, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of qi
Descriptive statistics of qi Correlation of qi  with 
Mean Min Labour intensity 
0.07 -0.49 0.14 
Median Max Proportion of unskilled workers 
0.03 1.45 -0.04 
sd Range Total employment 
0.17 1.94 0.49 
Notes: Industry- specific measure of swingness and decisiveness, qi, computed 
from data for 242 four-digit SIC industries using Stromberg’s (2005) measure 
of the probability of being swing and decisive and the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics employment dataset. Summary statistics are provided in the first two 
columns of the table. The third column reports the correlation of the measure 
with three other industry characteristics: Labour intensity, as the fraction of 
payroll in value added in 1982, Proportion of unskilled workers as the share of 
employees in an industry classified as unskilled in 1982, and total employment 
measured in millions of persons for 1982. Source: BLS (1983), 1982 Census of 
Manufacturing, Stromberg (2005).  
ti
1 + ti
= γ0 + γ1Ii
zi
ei
+ γ2
zi
ei
+ γ3qi + Z1i + Z2i + si (32)
which is also corrected for the simultaneity bias by using IV. The campaign
contributions literature does not suggest the concentration of industries in swing
and decisive states as a determinant for trade policy decision-making, implying
that γ3 is zero. The next section provides evidence that qi is a significant
determinant of NTB protection of an industry, thus lending support to our
theoretical results.
3.3 Empirical Results
Our findings are reported in table (2). The first column reports the results of
the benchmark specification given by (29). It is consistent with the coeﬃcients
reported21 in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and qualitatively close to
those obtained by Goldberg and Maggi (1999). As predicted by Grossman and
Helpman (1995), in politically organised sectors, higher industry output relative
to imports and a lower price elasticity of imports increases the level of protection
21The significance levels of the coeﬃcients are smaller than those reported in their paper
due to our use of robust standard errors.
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Table 2: Reduced form regression results
Dependent Variable: NTBi /(1+NTBi) 
 (1) (2) 
  Beta  Beta 
qi     0.192** 0.233 
   (0.038)  
Ii (zi/ei) 4.761+ 1.383 3.330 0.967 
 (2.781)  (2.532)  
zi/ei -4.704+ -1.384 -3.319 -0.977 
 (2.664)  (2.402)  
Intermediates’ tariffs 0.734* 0.190 0.809** 0.209 
 (0.319)  (0.312)  
Intermediates’ NTBs 0.378** 0.388 0.337** 0.345 
 (0.090)  (0.086)  
Observations 242 242 242 242 
F-test model (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
J-test overidentification (p-value) 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08 
Centered R2 0.21 0.20 0.29 0.28 
Estimator 2SLS  2SLS  
Notes: IV-2SLS regressions, instruments reported in appendix D. Robust standard errors in parentheses; + denotes 
statistical significance at the 10% level; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level. Includes constant not reported. The dependent variable is the Non Tariff Barriers 
coverage ratio. In both specifications, (zi/ei) is the ratio of inverse import penetration to import elasticity. Ii (zi/ei)  
is the same ratio multiplied by a dummy Ii that indicates whether a sector is politically organized or not. 
Intermediates tariff is computed as the average tariff on intermediate goods used by industry i and Intermediates 
Ntbs the average Non Tariff Barriers coverage of these intermediates. In the second specification, an additional 
explanatory variable is added. Industry- specific measure of swingness and decisiveness, qi, computed from data for 
242 four-digit SIC industries using Strömberg (2005) measure of the probability of being swing and decisive and 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics employment dataset. The beta coefficients are reported for both specifications. The 
p-values of the F-test model and J-test overidentification are reported. Data source: Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000), Strömberg (2005), BLS (1983) and authors’ own calculations. 
 
(γ1 > 0). In politically disorganised sectors, the coeﬃcient has the opposite sign
(γ2 < 0).
The results from specification (32) appear in column (2). Our measure of
“industry swingness and decisiveness” does not aﬀect the sign, magnitude of the
coeﬃcients on Ii(zi/ei) and zi/ei. Their significance is only slightly reduced,
indicating a relative robustness of the Grossman Helpman model. The point
estimate of γ3 is 0.192 (significant at the 1%, with a robust standard error of
0.038). Thus sectors that concentrate more than their national average in swing
and decisive states receive more protection. This estimate translates into a
normalised beta coeﬃcient of 0.233, such that a one standard deviation increase
in the industry’s swingness and decisiveness will increase the US NTB coverage
ratio for that sector by approximately 0.233 standard deviations. Although
this beta is smaller than that of the Grossman-Helpman variables, it is more
significant, and as important as the trade protection measures on intermediates.
Moreover, including our measure of swingness and decisiveness explains a larger
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proportion of the variation of protection levels across sectors, as it increases
the centered R2 by 30% relative to the Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)
benchmark specification.
These findings provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis that industrial
concentration in swing and decisive states is an important determinant of trade
protection of that industry, highlighting geographical concentration of industries
in politically key states an important, and previously overlooked, determinant
of trade protection in the US Electoral College.
4 Conclusion
The political agency model developed in this paper oﬀers a multi-jurisdictional
framework for analysing electoral incentives for trade protection. For distribu-
tions of voters where support by swing voters increases re-election probability,
a unique equilibrium is shown to exist where political incumbents build a rep-
utation of protectionism through their policy decisions in their first term of
oﬃce. The extension to a multi-state framework modelled as an electoral col-
lege introduces a spatial dimension that shows how the incentives driving trade
policy hinge on the distribution of swing voters across swing states. We show
that strategic trade protection is more likely when protectionist swing voters
have a lead over free-trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral
competition, swing states, that also represent a larger proportion of electoral
votes, thus being more decisive in the overall election. The analytical results
oﬀer a theoretical explanation for why governments may sometimes push for
the protection of industries with concentrations in pivotal locations, such as the
US steel production industry. Moreover, our empirical strategy augments the
benchmark test of the lobbying political economy of trade literature to include a
measure of how industries specialise geographically in these swing and decisive
states. The reduced form evidence is that the concentration of industries in
politically important states is a significant element in explaining trade policy.
These findings provide support for the theory highlighting an important, and
previously overlooked, determinant of trade protection.
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Appendix A. Voter Value Functions
Section 2 establishes the optimality of the incumbents’ strategies, given voters’
strategies, for the equilibrium where ∆v > 0. This appendix shows that the re-
election rule of the infinitely-lived F and P swing voters is also optimal, given
politicians’ strategies. This confirms that the politicians’ and voters’ strategies
constitute a Markov Perfect equilibrium of the game.
Let VP denote the value function for a protectionist voter. Further, let σrP
denote the probability that a P voter votes for the incumbent, given policy r in
his first term of oﬃce. σrP contributes to the incumbent’s re-election probability
by a tiny amount, thus marginally aﬀecting his prospective payoﬀs. σrP is thus
introduced in VP as an argument of the incumbent’s re-election probability, f (·),
which is smooth and continuous from the assumptions of the model. Further, let
u1P (π) denote the utility of P voters in the incumbent’s first term of oﬃce, where
π is the probability of the incumbent having protectionist views. Similarly,
denote P voters’ second term utility as u2P (eπr), where this is a function of
update beliefs after observing r in the first term. Finally, β is the common
discount factor. Combining these allows the value function, VP , to be expressed
as follows:
VP = u1P (π) + β
X
r
£
f (σrP )
¡
u2P (eπr) + βVP ¢+ (1− f (σrP ))VP ¤ (33)
The following proof uses (33) to show that given incumbents’ strategies, σ0P = 0
and σ1P = 1 are optimal responses. That is, protectionists vote for the incumbent
if he chooses trade protection in his first term and for the challenger if free trade
is chosen. In order for σrP = 1 to be an optimal response, it must be true from
(33) that u2P (eπr)+βVP ≥ VP . This can be rearranged to the following condition:
u2P (eπr) ≥ (1− β)VP (34)
To see this, consider that f (σrP ) and 1−f (σrP ) are weights for u2P (eπr)+βVP
and VP , respectively, in the value function. Voter P maximises his eﬀect on
f (σrP ) through σ
r
P = 1, and thus places the largest possible weight on u
2
P (eπr)+
βVP relative to VP . Hence, σrP = 1 can only be optimal if (34) holds.
Recall that P voters receive a payoﬀ x if r = 1 and 0 otherwise. Since
Pr(r = 1 in 1st term) = π+(1−π)p, it follows that u1P (π) = [π + (1− π)p]x > 0.
Moreover, since Pr(r = 1 in 2nd term | r = 0 in 1st term) = 0, it follows that
u2P
³eπ0´ = 0. That is, the incumbent reveals himself to be a free-trader if he
chooses r = 0 in his first term, given ∆v > 0. Since the incumbent follows his
preferences in his final term in oﬃce, soP voters can be certain of a 0 payoﬀ. If
the incumbent sets r = 1 in his first term, then voters can update their beliefs
regarding the probability of r = 1 being chosen in his second term, if re-elected.
Applying Bayes’ rule for eπ1, P voters can expect u2P ³eπ1´ = πxπ+(1−π)p .
It must be true that VP ≥ 11−βu1P (π), where
1
1−βu
1
P (π) is the discounted
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stream of period 1 utilities, if the incumbent is never re-elected. Substituting
into (34) yields:
u2P (eπr) ≥ u1P (π) (35)
This must hold for σrP = 1 to be optimal, for all r, but leads to a con-
tradiction. It cannot be true that u2P
³eπ0´ ≥ u1P (π) since u2P ³eπ0´ = 0 and
u1P (π) > 0. Hence, σ
r
P = 1 (for all r) cannot be an optimal response. Since
u2P
³eπ0´ < u1P (π), a new politician is always a better bet than an incumbent
who set r = 0 in his first term. Hence, σ0P = 0 is optimal. Moreover, continua-
tion payoﬀ 11−βu
1
P (π) must be smaller than
1
1−βu
2
P
³eπ1´ under the equilibrium
strategies of incumbents’, so σ1P = 1 is an optimal response.
The value function of free-traders, VF , is symmetric to VP and the optimality
strategies σ0F = 1 and σ
1
F = 0 follows with arguments symmetric to those
used above. We can thus conclude that the politicians’ and voters’ strategies
constitute a Markov Perfect equilibrium of the game.
Appendix B. Equilibrium Uniqueness
There are two symmetric cases, ∆v > 0 and ∆v < 0, where reputation-building
through strategic policy implementation forms part of incumbents’ optimal
strategies. In each of these symmetric cases, there is a unique equilibrium.
To show that the equilibrium found in the paper is unique, consider a distri-
bution of swing voters under which ∆v > 0 from the implementation of trade
protection in the first term.
Recall that when a high cost cH is drawn, it is a dominant strategy for free-
trader politicians to set r = 1. Moreover, let σrP denote the probability that a P
voter votes for the incumbent, given policy r in his first term of oﬃce. Under a
suﬃciently low cost draw, cL, it must be the case that σ1P > σ
0
P for a free-trader
to deviate from r = 0. Similarly, for a protectionist to deviate from r = 1 in his
first term of oﬃce, it must be true that σ1P < σ
0
P . Hence, in any equilibrium at
most one type of politician deviates from his preferred policy in the first term.
Moreover, to show that mixing between r = 0 and r = 1 cannot be an
equilibrium, consider a strategy where a free-trader incumbent sets r = 1 with
a probability less than 1 when c = cL. For this to be an equilibrium, it must be
the case that σ1Pβζ−cL = σ0Pβζ and hence that cL =
¡
σ1P − σ0P
¢
βζ. Inspection
of VP in Appendix A shows that σ1P = 1 and σ
0
P = 0 remain optimal. This,
however, implies that cL = βζ that contradicts the assumption that βζ > cL.
It can similarly be shown that a strategy in which a protectionist sets r = 1
with less than certainty can never form part of an equilibrium. Such a strategy
requires that σ1Pβζ = σ
0
Pβζ − cL, that implies cL =
¡
σ0P − σ1P
¢
βζ. This is
impossible, however, since voters’ optimal strategy in this case is to set σ1P =
1 and σ0P = 0. It follows that the unique equilibrium outcome is for an F
incumbent to set r = 1 when c = cL and for a P incumbent to also set r = 1
under a low cost draw.
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We can conclude that the equilibrium discussed in the paper is unique for
distributions of swing voters that satisfy the conditions for this case, and suﬃ-
ciently low p and cL. Symmetric arguments apply for the alternative case where
∆v < 0.
Appendix C. Untested Candidates
Consider an election taking place between two randomly selected candidates,
each with a probability π of being protectionist. Since neither candidate has
a history of a trade policy decision on which swing voters can condition their
voting decision, the swing voters cast their vote on the basis of a coin toss.
Each candidate can thus expect to gain 12 (γ
s
P + γ
s
F ). Hence, the Democrat
candidate gains γsD +
1
2 (γ
s
P + γ
s
F ) + ν
s and the Republican candidate gains
γsR +
1
2 (γ
s
P + γ
s
F ) − νs. For the D candidate to win a majority in state s,
2νs = εs must exceed γsR−γsD = −ωsp. Let ρsdenote the probability that the D
candidate wins a majority in state s. It follows from the distribution of εs that:
ρs = Pr
¡
εs > −ωsp
¢
= 1−H(−ωsp) (36)
= H
¡
ωsp
¢
(37)
Hence, 1−H
¡
ωsp
¢
is the probability that R wins majority in state s. Hence
state-level outcomes depend only on the political lead in s and H(εs). This
stems from the assumption that single-issue voters randomly select between
the two candidates, so each candidate can expect to gain support by half. An
alternative voting strategy could allocate swing voters in a diﬀerent proportion.
For example, when candidates are not distinguishable with regards to trade
policy, voters may cast a vote on the basis of underlying ideological position,
that is otherwise dominated by trade policy considerations.
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Appendix D. Variables and Instruments
The following table provide a descriptions of all the variables and instruments
used in the empirical analysis of section 3.
Table 3: Variables and instruments list
Variable Description 
NTBi Aggregate US Non Tariff Barriers coverage ratio across all partners for industry i  
qi Constructed measure of the concentration of 4-digit SIC industry i in swing and decisive political states 
Ii Dummy variable, value 1 when sector i is politically organized 
zi Inverse of import penetration ratio divided by 10000 (= (US consumption in 1983/ US total imports)/10000) in sector i 
ei Price elasticity of imports in sector i, corrected for errors-in-variables (GB, 2000) 
Interm. tariffs Average tariff on intermediate goods used in industry i 
Interm. NTBs Average NTB coverage ratio on intermediate goods used in industry i 
Instrument  
1 Average tariff on intermediate goods used in industry i 
2 Average NTB coverage ratio on intermediate goods used in industry i 
3 Price elasticity of imports (1986) 
4 Logarithm of the price elasticity of imports ei 
5 Measure of the size of firms in an industry: Value added per firm, 1982, ($Bn/firm) 
6 Share of output in a sector produced by the four largest producers. concentration ratio, 1982 
7 Share of employees in the industry defined as scientistsand engineers, 1982 
8 Share of employees in the industry defined as managerial, 1982 
9 Share of employees in the industry defined as unskilled, 1982 
10 Real Exchange Rate elasticity of imports 
11 Cross price elasticity of imports with resepct to domestic prices, corrected for errors-in-variables (GB, 2000) 
12 Log percentage of an industry’s output used as intermediate good in other sectors 
13 Logarithm of the intermediate goods buyer concentration 
14 Herfindahl index of the industry 
15 Ad valorem tariff 
16 Capital-Labor ratio of the industry x Dummy for food processing industry 
17 Capital-Labor ratio of the industry x Dummy for resource-intensive industry 
18 Capital-Labor ratio of the industry x Dummy for general manufacturing industry 
19 Capital-Labor ratio of the industry x Dummy for capital intensive industry 
20-36 Instruments 3 to 19 squared 
37-52 Instruments 4 to 19 x price elasticity of imports ei 
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